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Abstract Species that compete for access to or use of sites, such as parasitic mites
attaching to honey bees or apple maggots laying eggs in fruits, can potentially increase
their fitness by carefully selecting sites at which they face little or no competition.
Here, we systematically investigate the evolution of site-selection strategies among
animals competing for discrete sites. By developing and analyzing a mechanistic and
population-dynamicalmodel of site selection inwhich searching individuals encounter
sites sequentially and can choose to accept or continue to search based on how many
conspecifics are already there, we give a complete characterization of the different
site-selection strategies that can evolve. We find that evolution of site-selection stabi-
lizes population dynamics, promotes even distribution of individuals among sites, and
occasionally causes evolutionary suicide. We also discuss the broader implications of
our findings and propose how they can be reconciled with an earlier study (Nonaka
et al. in J Theor Biol 317:96–104, 2013) that reported selection toward ever higher
levels of aggregation among sites as a consequence of site-selection.
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1 Introduction
As you are reading this sentence, billions of organisms are engaged in a fierce struggle
for the acquisition of territory and resources. While the population dynamics of these
organisms are strictly dependent on multifarious factors such as individual behav-
ior, resource availability, somatic growth, predation risk, mobility, diseases, and mate
competition, important insights can often be attained by considering selected factors
in isolation. The dynamics of populations that compete for access to or use of sites,
such as mites, bean weevils, parasitic wasps, parasitic birds, aphids, and plants, are
dependent on the distribution of individuals among sites and the competition within
sites. These two factors are well-suited for mathematical description, and a model-
ing framework has been developed by Johansson and Sumpter (2003), Sumpter and
Broomhead (2001), Brännström and Sumpter (2005b), and Anazawa (2009, 2010,
2012a, b, 2014). The site-based framework developed in these papers allows for flex-
ible and independent specification of the distribution of individuals among sites as
well as the competitive interactions within sites.
One of the successes of the site-based framework was when Brännström and
Sumpter (2005b) showed how combinations of assumptions on competition and
clustering give rise to classical discrete-time population models. Allowing for two
competing species, Anazawa (2014) further considered correlations in the number of
individuals of each species within a site.While these two studies are forerunners in that
they allow for other distributions than the Poisson distribution for individuals among
sites (which results from random site choice with uniform probability), the distribu-
tion of individuals among sites is largely assumed without careful thought given to the
underlying processes. The foremost of these processes is arguably evolutionwhichwill
over time select for settlement strategies that offer individual advantages. One prior
study by Nonaka et al. (2013) has considered how evolution affects site-selection in
a site-based setting. That study, however, rests on the restrictive assumption that the
desire to settle in an occupied site increases linearly with the number of individuals
already there.
Here, we show for the first time how evolution of general site-selection strategies
can be integrated with the site-based framework. To avoid introducing anthropogenic
biases or artificially constraining the outcomes, wemake onlyminimal assumptions on
individual settlement and interaction and include the full feedback loop from individual
behavior up to demographic change and from demographic composition down to
selection on individual behaviors. To demonstrate the wide reach of the resulting eco-
evolutionary system, we tackle three salient complementary questions which have
until now not been systematically investigated.
First, we investigate how the evolution of site-selection strategies affect population
dynamics and find that it generally stabilizes population dynamics independent of
the type of interaction. Second, we study how the evolution of site-selection strategies
affects the distribution of individuals among sites.We find that selection always favors
a more even distribution of individuals among sites than what would result from a
randomsite choicewith uniformprobability. This contrasts sharplywith the conclusion
by Nonaka et al. (2013) who found selection toward higher degrees of aggregation.
Third, we consider the potential for evolutionary suicide and find that evolution of
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site-selection strategies occasionally causes the extinction of the population through
either of two alternative routes.
We will establish and expand on the three conclusions above in Sect. 3, though
we will first take the time to introduce and explain the mechanistic assumptions that
underly them.
2 Model and Methods
We consider the site-based framework of Sumpter and Broomhead (2001), Johansson
and Sumpter (2003), and Brännström and Sumpter (2005b). The demographic dynam-
ics unfold in non-overlapping generations. At each generation, individuals distribute
themselves among resource sites according to their adopted behavioral strategy s, as
described further below. The per-capita reproductive rate is then determined by the
number of individuals at the same resource site. With the exception of rare mutations,
the offspring faithfully inherit the behavioral strategies of their parents and emerge
from the sites to constitute the next generation in a repetitive cycle. This gives the
discrete-time dynamical system
xt+1 = f (xt ) =
∞∑
k=1
pk(s, xt )kϕ(k), (1)
in which xt is the population density in generation t, pk(s, xt ) is the probability that a
site contains k individuals and ϕ(k) is the per-capita number of offspring of individuals
in that site. In subsequent sections below, we describe how the probabilities pk emerge
from individual behavior, the different interaction functions ϕ(k) that we consider, and
the resultant evolutionary dynamics.
2.1 Individual Behavior and Resulting Population Dynamics
2.1.1 Distribution Among Sites
Let xˆ denote the population density of individuals to be distributed among sites. We
assume that individuals encounter sites randomly, according to the law of mass action
with rate α. At each encounter, the focal individual observes the number of individ-
uals in the encountered site and has the option to settle in that site or to continue
searching for other sites. In this work, we assume that once an individual has set-
tled into a site, the decision is final, thus it cannot leave even if the site would later
become crowded. In contrast, Parvinen et al. (2012) investigated the evolution of
density-dependent emigration and immigration strategies in a metapopulation setting.
The component sk of the vector-valued strategy of an individual is the probability to
settle in an encountered patch containing k individuals at the moment. To keep the
number of equations finite, we set a maximum number of individuals K that a site can
contain, so that settlement into a site with K individuals is not possible. We choose
K large enough so that this assumption only has negligible effects on our numerical
results.
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Let τ denote the time within the process of distributing individuals among sites. Let
x(τ ) denote the population density of individuals that at time τ are not yet distributed.
Initially x(0) = xˆ . Let pk(τ ) denote the probability that a randomly chosen site has k
individuals at time τ . Initially, all sites are empty, thus p0(0) = 1 and pk(0) = 0 for
all k = 1, 2, . . . , K . For a monomorphic resident population, the assumptions made
above mean that the probabilities pk(τ ) satisfy the differential equations
d
dτ
p0(τ ) = −αx(τ )s0 p0(τ )
d
dτ
pk(τ ) = αx(τ ) (sk−1 pk−1(τ ) − sk pk(τ ))
d
dτ
pK (τ ) = αx(τ )sK−1 pK−1(τ ), (2)
and that the population density x(τ ) of unsettled individuals satisfy
d
dτ
x(τ ) = −αx(τ )
K−1∑
k=0
sk pk(τ ). (3)
For a polymorphic population with n morphs, the components x(τ )sk need to be
replaced by
∑n
i=1 xi (τ )sik , in which xi (τ ) is the population density of non-distributed
individuals with strategy si . Furthermore, let
y(τ ) =
K∑
k=0
kpk(τ ) (4)
denote the population density of settled individuals. Initially y(0) = 0, and a straight-
forward calculation shows that
d
dτ
y(τ ) =
K∑
k=0
k
d
dτ
pk(τ ) = αx(τ )
K−1∑
k=0
sk pk(τ ) = − d
dτ
x(τ ). (5)
In principle, we could assume that there is no restriction on the time allowed for site
searching, and thus let all individuals to find a site. However, we find it more realistic
that settlement into suitable sites is possible only during 0  τ  T . This means that
too picky individuals (with low values of sk) take the risk that they will not settle into a
site at all, and thus fail to reproduce. The size-distribution of sites in the discrete-time
population dynamics (1) is thus obtained by solving the differential Eqs. (2) and (5)
until time T .
Note that the assumptions made above differ in several aspects from the earlier
study by Nonaka et al. (2013), in which individuals were forced to choose one of the
sites in a sequential but random order with different preferences based on the sizes
of the sites. The assumptions made in the earlier model mean that at the moment of
decision, the focal individual has perfect knowledge about the number of individuals
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Table 1 Investigated interactions and the corresponding nonzero values of the interaction function ϕ(k)
Competition Without Allee effect, ϕ(k) = With Allee effect, ϕ(k) =
Pure scramble b1 for k = 1 b2 for k = 2
General scramble b1 for k = 1, b2 for k = 2 b2 for k = 2, b3 for k = 3
in all sites, and the focal individual makes the decision into which site to settle based
on that knowledge, and instantly settles into the chosen site.We find the present model,
as described above, to be more realistic.
2.1.2 Interaction in Sites
After the individuals have selected their sites, they interact according to the interaction
function ϕ(k) giving the per-capita number of offspring as a function of the number of
individuals k at the site. This function is meaningful only when k = 1, 2, 3, . . .. In this
paper,wewill consider scramble competition between individuals. This corresponds to
situations in which reproductive output is greatly reduced whenever sufficiently many
individuals occupy the same site (see Table 1).We focus on this competition type since
the site-selection then becomes critical for the individual’s ability to reproduce.
In pure scramble competition, reproduction is possible only when an individual
holds an entire site for itself, resulting in ϕ(1) = b1 where b1 is the number of
offspring such an individual produces on average, while ϕ(k) = 0 otherwise. We
also consider a more general form of scramble competition in which two individuals
sharing a site can also reproduce. While one might expect that, in such situations,
ϕ(1) > ϕ(2), we leave the specification of ϕ(1) and ϕ(2) arbitrary so as to include
the possibility of mutualistic interactions. For these interaction functions, we also
consider corresponding interaction functions with an Allee effect (Allee et al. 1949),
where individuals require the presence of others to reproduce. Specifically, we assume
that in the presence of an Allee effect, reproduction of lonely individuals is not
possible.
2.1.3 Demographic Dynamics
If individuals always settle into a site they encounter, and K is infinite, the density of
settled individuals at time T is y(T ) = xˆ(1− e−αT ), and the size-distribution of sites
follows the Poisson distribution with mean y(T ), thus pk(T ) = e−y(T )y(T )k/k!. If
we let T → ∞, and thus all individuals settle into a site, the resulting discrete-time
dynamics with pure scramble competition results in
xt+1 = bxt e−xt , (6)
which is the Ricker (1954) model. In the limit T → ∞, we thus recover the classical
site-based framework of Sumpter and Broomhead (2001) and Johansson and Sumpter
(2003)whoconsidered individuals distributeduniformly among sites (see alsoRoyama
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1992 for a closely related setting, as well as Appendix B of Brännström and Sumpter
2005b for a proof that the two frameworks are mathematically equivalent). For general
strategy values, we are not able to give a simple analytical expression for the discrete-
time population dynamics.
2.2 Evolutionary Dynamics
2.2.1 Adaptive Dynamics
We investigate the evolutionary dynamics using techniques of adaptive dynamics
(Dieckmann and Law 1996; Metz et al. 1996; Geritz et al. 1998 and others; see
also the gentle introduction by Brännström et al. 2013). To facilitate the analy-
sis, we assume that reproduction is clonal, and that the offspring are identical to
their parents, except in rare instances when mutations occur. Since mutations are
rare, we can assume that the resident population has reached a demographic attrac-
tor by the time the mutation occurs. The fate of the invading mutant is assessed
from the mutant strain’s exponential growth rate while still rare in the resident
environment. We will refer to this exponential growth rate as the invasion fitness
(Metz et al. 1992).
Most studies on adaptive dynamics to date consider the evolution of a single trait
value. By contrast, we consider the simultaneous evolution of several trait valueswhich
are jointly referred to as a vector-valued trait (see e.g., Brown et al. 2007; Parvinen
et al. 2012). These traits are the probabilities sk that an individual assessing a sitewith k
individuals will attach to that site. The principles behind adaptive dynamics of vector-
valued traits are no different from those of a single trait value, but the conditions for
assessing convergence stability (Leimar 2001, 2009) and evolutionary stability (Geritz
et al. 2016) need to be extended to several dimensions.
For the model presented here, we find that there can be up to two attractors of the
demographic dynamics. First, an extant population has a unique attractor which is
a stable equilibrium, a periodic orbit, or a chaotic orbit. Second, with strong Allee
effects, the extinction equilibrium is also a stable attractor. We next explain how the
invasion fitness for a mutant with site-attachment probabilities different from those of
the extant resident population is determined.
2.2.2 Invasion Fitness in the Present Model
Now, we study what happens for a mutant with strategy values smutk in the
site-distribution process. Since the mutant is globally rare, it will not affect the site-
distribution process of the resident population. Therefore, the probability pk(τ ) that a
randomly chosen site has k individuals at time τ is obtained by solving the differential
Eqs. (2) and (3) for the resident population(s). Let xmut(τ ) denote the probability that
at time τ , a randomly chosen mutant has not settled into any site. Furthermore, let
qmutk (τ ) denote the probability that a randomly chosen mutant has settled into a site
which contains k residents at time τ . Note that the actual settlement time needs not
to be exactly known, but it belongs to the interval [0, τ ]. At time 0, no individuals
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have settled into sites, and thus qmutk (0) = 0 for all k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , K − 1. These
probabilities satisfy the differential equations
d
dτ
qmut0 (τ ) = αxmut(τ )smut0 p0(τ ) − αx(τ )s1qmut0 (τ )
d
dτ
qmutk (τ ) = αxmut(τ )smutk pk(τ ) + αx(τ )
(
skq
mut
k−1(τ ) − sk+1qmutk (τ )
)
d
dτ
qmutK−1(τ ) = αxmut(τ )smutK−1 pK−1(τ ) + αx(τ )sK−1qmutK−2(τ ). (7)
The first term describes the rate at which encounters of a mutant and a site (without
mutants) result in the settlement of that mutant into a site with currently k residents.
Note that the mutant is rare, and thus the probability that a mutant encounters a site
with at least one mutant is zero. The other terms describe the effect of a resident
settling into a site which already contains one mutant and potentially some residents.
Furthermore, we have
d
dτ
xmut(τ ) = −αxmut(τ )
K−1∑
k=0
smutk pk(τ ). (8)
Note that
d
dτ
(
xmut(τ ) +
K−1∑
k=0
qmutk (τ )
)
= 0, (9)
which means that xmut(τ )+∑K−1k=0 qmutk (τ ) = 1 for all τ . By solving (7) and (8) until
time T we obtain the site-distribution of mutants. Since with probability one there can
be only one mutant in a site, the expected number of mutant offspring per a mutant is
F(smut, xres, sres) =
K−1∑
k=0
qmutk (s
mut, xres, sres)ϕ(k + 1). (10)
In case the population-dynamical attractor of the resident is a fixed point xres, the
basic reproduction number is directly given by (10). In general, if the attractor is an
n-cyclic orbit consisting of points x jres for j = 1, . . . , n, we have
R(smut) = n
√√√√
n∏
j=1
F(smut, x jres, sres). (11)
The logarithm
r(smut) = ln R(smut) = 1
n
n∑
j=1
ln F(smut, x jres, sres) (12)
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is the invasion fitness of the mutant (Metz et al. 1992) and can be used in the evolu-
tionary analyses of the model. A mutant may invade the resident only if R(smut) > 1.
3 Results
We allow site-selection to evolve under a range of plausible interaction functions,
with and without an Allee effect. We first show in Sect. 3.1 that evolution of site-
selection generally stabilizes the population dynamics. In Sect. 3.2, we show that it
can surprisingly also lead to the extinction of the population by evolutionary suicide
through either of two different routes. Finally, in Sect. 3.3, we demonstrate that the
distributions of individuals that arise for evolutionarily stable site-selection strategies
are underdispersed, i.e., non-aggregated.
3.1 Population Dynamics are Generally Stabilized
Under pure scramble competition, the population dynamics are stabilized by evolution.
This conclusion holds also in the presence of a strongAllee effect, though interestingly
not always for interaction functions in between these two extremes.
3.1.1 Pure Scramble Competition
Under pure scramble competition, reproduction is possible only in sites with one
individual and the interaction function consequently satisfies ϕ(1) = b1 and ϕ(k) = 0
for k = 1. Figure 1 shows how the evolution of site selection gradually leads from an
initial state in which individuals always settle and frequently overexploit the available
resource to a situation in which individuals only settle in empty sites (Fig. 1a). The
individuals thus increasingly avoid overexploitation (Fig. 1b) and the evolutionary
process eventually gives rise to a monotonically increasing return map (Fig. 1c) with
corresponding stable population dynamics.
When the resident population has the always settle strategy and K → ∞, the
population size in sites is Poisson-distributed.The returnmapof the resident population
is thus described by,
xt+1 = b1 p1(T ) = b1γ xt e−γ xt , where γ = 1 − e−αT , (13)
which is thewell-knownRickermodel. This population exhibits period-doubling bifur-
cation to chaos as the parameter b1 is increased (Fig. 1b, thick dashed curve). Under
natural selection, the site-selection strategy gradually evolves to the state s0 = 1,
sk = 0 for k = 1, 2, . . ., so that individuals eventually settle only into empty sites.
In turn, the return map gradually changes from the Ricker model to a monotonically
increasing curve (Fig. 1b). Once selection has come to a halt at the evolutionarily stable
site-selection strategy, the resulting return map can be explicitly expressed as
xt+1 = f (xt ) = b1 p1(T ) = b1 xt
(
eαT − eαT xt )
eαT − xt eαT xt . (14)
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Fig. 1 (Color figure online) Evolution stabilizes population dynamics under pure scramble competition:
a a trait substitution sequence initiated with the always settle strategy (1, 1, . . . , 1) (thick dashed curve)
converging to strategy (1, 0, s2, s3, . . .) (thick curve). b Discrete-time population models corresponding to
the strategies in panel (a). cDiscrete-time populationmodels corresponding to the ESS strategy for different
values of b1. Points in panels b and c show the population-dynamical attractors. Parameters: Panel a and b:
b1 = 16. All panels: αT = 2.5
The extinction equilibrium x = 0 is stable if f ′(0) = b1
(
1 − e−αT ) < 1. Further
calculations show that the model (14) is increasing with respect to xt (the derivative
f ′(x) > 0 for all x  0), and limx→∞ f (x) = b1. Furthermore, the function f is
concave. This means that if f ′(0) < 1, the extinction equilibrium is globally stable,
and if f ′(0) > 1, the extinction equilibrium is unstable, and there exists a unique
positive equilibrium, and it is globally stable, even for large b1 (Fig. 1c). Evolution
of site-selection strategies thus stabilizes population dynamics at least under pure
scramble competition.
Why does gradual evolution of site-selection result in individuals settling only into
empty sites? Settling into a site occupied by one individual is not beneficial, because
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the reproductive potential vanishes. Settlement into sites with more individuals is not
beneficial either. Actually, when the strategy s1 has reached the value 0, the strategy
components s2, s3, . . . become selectively neutral, because s1 = 0 means that there
will be no sites of size 2 and larger. When s1 = 0, an individual who settles into an
empty site will surely be able to reproduce. Therefore, s0 should evolve to 1.
3.1.2 Pure Scramble Competition with an Allee Effect
Next, we consider the interaction function with ϕ(2) = b2 and ϕ(k) = 0 for k = 2.
This corresponds to pure scramble competition with a strong Allee effect, in which
exactly two individuals are required in a site to successfully reproduce. Figure2a
illustrates how site-selection will now evolve to the strategy of settling whenever
a site contain either none or exactly one individual. While this affects the precise
from of the return map, the qualitative findings remain the same as for pure scramble
competition. Again, we have Poisson-distributed population sizes in sites when the
resident individuals always settle into encountered sites. The population dynamics
satisfy
xt+1 = b2 p2(T ) = b2γ 2x2t e−γ xt , where γ = 1 − e−αT . (15)
For small b2, the population is not viable.When b2 is increased, two positive equilibria
appear, of which the larger one is stable. Increasing b2 further will cause the larger
positive equilibrium to become unstable, and we observe a cascade of period-doubling
bifurcations leading to chaos. Eventually, the chaotic attractor will collide with the
lower unstable positive equilibrium, beyond which the population is not viable due
to the Allee effect. For a similar series of bifurcations with respect to a fecundity
parameter, see Fig. 12 of Parvinen (2005) and Fig. 3c of Parvinen and Dieckmann
(2013). Under natural selection, the site-selection strategy gradually evolves to the
state s0 = 1, s1 = 1, and sk = 0, for k = 1, 2, . . ., so that individuals eventually settle
only into sites that are either empty or contain exactly one individual. In turn, the return
map gradually changes from the Ricker model to a monotonically increasing curve
(Fig. 2b). The evolutionary process eventually results in the monotonically increasing
return map shown as the thick solid curve in Fig. 2b (see also Fig. 2c for examples
of how the resulting return map changes depending on individual fecundity b2) with
corresponding stable population dynamics.
Why does the settlement strategy evolve to a strategy of settling when the site
contains either none or exactly one individual? If an individual encounters a patch
with two or more individuals, settlement into such a site would mean that none of
them can reproduce. Therefore, the selection gradient for each strategy component
s2, s3, . . . is negative (unless some sk = 0 making sk+1, sk+2, . . . selectively neutral).
Consider now the case s2 = 0: if an individual encounters a site with 1 individ-
ual, it can guarantee its reproductive success by settling into that site. Therefore,
s1 should evolve to 1. How should the strategy component s0 evolve when s1 = 1
and s2 = 0? If the population density is large and an individual settles into an
empty site, it is very likely that another individual will settle there too, resulting
in reproductive success. In contrast, if the population density is low, an individual
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Fig. 2 (Color figure online) Evolution stabilizes population dynamics also under pure scramble competition
with Allee effect: a a trait substitution sequence initiated with the always settle strategy (1, 1, . . . , 1) (thick
dashed curve) converging to strategy (1, 1, 0, s3, s4, . . .) (thick curve). b Discrete-time population models
corresponding to the strategies in panel (a). c Discrete-time population models corresponding to the ESS
strategy for different values of b2. Points in panels b and c show the population-dynamical attractors.
Parameters: Panel a and b: b2 = 8. All panels: αT = 2.5
settling into an empty site may encounter the risk that nobody will manage to set-
tle there as well, and it could instead be better to search for a site which already
contains one individual. We investigated this possibility numerically and observed
that there is a threshold population density so that for smaller population densities,
values smaller than 1 for the strategy component s0 would be beneficial. However,
the population density in a stable positive equilibrium appears to always be larger
than the aforementioned threshold. Therefore, the strategy s0 = s1 = 1, sk = 0
for all k = 2, 3, . . . is an evolutionary attractor and uninvadable (evolutionarily
stable).
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3.1.3 General Scramble Competition
We now investigate the evolution of site-selection under general scramble competition
through the interaction function,
ϕ(k) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
b1, for k = 1,
b2, for k = 2,
0, otherwise.
(16)
As this interaction function is intermediate between pure scramble competition and
pure scramble competition with Allee effect, which have been explored in the two
previous sections, one might hypothesize that the evolved site-selection strategy
and resulting population dynamics will also be intermediate between the two. For
most values of b1 and b2, this intuition bears out. Evolution will result in a site-
selection strategy identical to that of pure scramble or pure scramble with Allee
effect, and the return map will be monotonically increasing with stable population
dynamics. Surprisingly, other outcomes are possible when it is much advantageous
for individuals to hold a site on their own rather than share it with a conspecific,
i.e., when b2  b1, Fig. 3a illustrates the evolution of site selection in a repre-
sentative case. Starting from the strategy of always settling, the selection gradient
for each strategy component s1, s2, . . . is initially negative with the rate of evolu-
tionary change being highest for strategy component s1. As soon as s1 = 0 has
been fixated in the population, selection for the remaining strategy components s2,
s3, . . . becomes neutral and random drift dominates. Random drift will at some
point cause the probability of settling into sites already containing two individu-
als to become small. Suddenly, it is advantageous for individuals to occasionally
forego an opportunity to settle into a site already containing one individual. Selec-
tion for s1 becomes positive while selection for s2 ceases to be neutral and again
becomes negative. This can result in such a settlement strategy that individuals
always settle in empty sites, sometimes settle in sites containing exactly one indi-
vidual, and never settle into sites with two or more individuals. While the emerging
settlement strategy is novel, it remains intermediate between pure scramble com-
petition and pure scramble competition with Allee effect. Does this mean that the
return map will also be intermediate between the two and hence again monotonically
increasing?
Figure 3b shows that evolution initially causes the return map to approach a
monotonic curve, and hence increase population-dynamical stability. However, when
the evolutionary process continues after some time of random drift, the trend is
reversed and the population increasingly experiences overcompensation, eventually
resulting in the return map corresponding to the solid curve in Fig. 3b with asso-
ciated periodic population dynamics. The generality of this finding is explored in
Fig. 3c–e, and the conclusion is that non-equilibrium dynamics as a result of evolution
of site-selection is possible only in a limited range of the parameter b2. Figure3c
shows return maps for different values of b2 with the corresponding population-
dynamical attractor shown in Fig. 3e. It is only for approximately 0.2  b2  0.8
that the return map does not give rise to stable population dynamics. To get a better
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Fig. 3 (Color figure online) Evolution can result in cyclic population dynamics under general scramble
competition: a a trait substitution sequence initiated with the always settle strategy (1, 1, . . . , 1) (thick
dashed curve) converging to strategy (1, s1, 0, s3, s4, . . .) with s1 ≈ 0.384 (thick curve). b Discrete-
time population models corresponding to the strategies in panel a. c Discrete-time population models
corresponding to the ESS strategy for different values of b2. Points in panels b and c show the population-
dynamical attractors. d Evolution of the strategy component s2 as a function of fecundity b2. Curves in
panel d show evolutionarily singular strategies. e Population-dynamical attractors corresponding to the
evolutionarily attracting singular strategies illustrated in panel d. Parameters: Panel a and b: b2 = 0.2. All
panels: αT = 2.5, b1 = 8
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view of the generality, the type of the ESS strategy and the type of the population-
dynamical attractor with that strategy are shown with respect to the parameters b1
and b2 in Fig. 4a. Figure 4a shows that for most of the parameter values evolution
results in the strategy (1, 1, 0, 0, . . .) according to which individuals always settle
to empty sites or sites with one individual, and never to sites with two or more
individuals. Furthermore, in contrast to the type of population dynamics with the
always settle strategy (Fig. 4b), evolution mostly results in equilibrium population
dynamics. Thus, although general scramble competition offers an interesting twist
by occasionally allowing novel settlement strategies and non-equilibrium population
dynamics, we again find that evolution of site-selection generally stabilizes population
dynamics.
3.2 Evolutionary Suicide Through Two Different Routes
Unexpectedly, while the evolution of site-selection generally tends to stabilize pop-
ulation dynamics, it can cause the extinction of the population through evolutionary
suicide (Ferrière 2000; Gyllenberg and Parvinen 2001; Gyllenberg et al. 2002; Parvi-
nen 2005; Parvinen andDieckmann 2013). In Sect. 3.2.1, we show that this can happen
when the population is subject to pure scramble competition with strong Allee effect.
The importance of this finding is underscored in Sect. 3.2.2 where we show that the
range of conditions under which evolutionary suicide unfolds increases for more gen-
eral interaction functions with strong Allee effects.
3.2.1 Extinction Through Changes in Chaotic Attractor
In the story thus far, we have emphasized the potential of evolution of site-selection
to stabilize population dynamics. Under very special circumstances, the evolutionary
process may result in the extinction of the population through either of two routes.
The first of these can arise under pure scramble competition with strong Allee effect,
provided that the fecundity parameter b2 is large enough for chaotic population dynam-
ics. Figure5a–c illustrates one representative case. Starting from a strategy of settling
when a site contains two individuals or less, s = (1, 1, 1, 0, . . .), population dynam-
ics is chaotic, and selection will reduce the strategy component s2 as individuals in
sites with three or more individuals will produce no offspring at all (Fig. 5a). This
causes the return map to change (Fig. 5b) and consequently affects the chaotic attrac-
tor. For a range of combinations of b2 and s2, the population is unviable (Fig. 5c).
The change from a viable chaotic attractor to unviability happens when the popu-
lation size first reaches the peak of the return map, but then fecundity is so small
because of overcompensation, that the population size in next generation falls below
the Allee threshold (inset of Fig. 5b). As s2 decreases through gradual evolution, the
chaotic attractor eventually changes to allow population sizes below the Allee thresh-
old. From this low abundance, the population cannot recover and extinction is an
inevitable outcome.
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Fig. 4 (Color figure online) Evolution typically stabilizes population dynamics under general scramble
competition: a Evolved settlement strategy and the corresponding population dynamics for different com-
binations of fecundities b1 and b2. The evolved strategy is either of the boundary strategies (1, 0, . . .) and
(1, 1, 0, . . .), or a singular strategy (1, s1, 0, . . .) with 0 < s1 < 1. b Type of the population-dynamical
attractor for the always settle strategy (1, 1, 1, . . .). Shading illustrates different types of population dynam-
ics
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Fig. 5 (Color figure online) First route to evolutionary suicide: a a trait substitution sequence initiated with
the strategy s = (1, 1, 1, 0, . . .). The strategy component s2 decreases until the population goes extinct. b
Explanation of the extinction. As a consequence of the decrease in s2, the return map for the population
dynamics changes so that a chaotic attractor collides with an unstable equilibrium, beyond which the
population is no longer viable. c Phase diagram illustrating when evolution of strategy component s2 results
in collision with an unstable equilibrium and eventual extinction. The interaction function is given by Eq. 17
3.2.2 Extinction Through Intraspecific Competition
Aqualitatively different type of evolutionary suicide can be revealed if we broaden our
investigation to more general interaction functions with strong Allee effects. Specifi-
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cally, we will consider the interaction function
ϕ(k) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
b2, for k = 2,
b3, for k = 3,
0, otherwise.
(17)
Similarly to general scramble competition, general scramble competition with Allee
effect occasionally introduces a conflict between the interests of the individual and
those of the population. This roughly occurs when the total number of individuals
emerging from a sitewith three individuals is less than the number emerging from a site
with two individuals, i.e., when 3b3 < 2b2. In such cases, an individual encountering
a site with two individuals might find it advantageous to settle with high chances of
securing b3 offspring rather than to keep searching for a more promising site in what
might ultimately prove to be a vain effort. The population, however, would be better
served if the individual did continue searching in the hope of colonizing and exploiting
more sites. In certain cases, the negative consequences of individual self-interest may
be so large that they induce extinction.
Figure 6a–c shows how evolution of site-selection may induce evolutionary sui-
cide. Starting from such a strategy that individuals always settle in empty sites and
sometimes in sites with one individual, selection is positive for both strategy compo-
nents s1 and s2. The strategy component s1 will reach the value 1, and the strategy
component s2 will increase further. As s2 increases, more and more sites will be occu-
pied by three individuals. This confers an individual advantage, but the competition
with conspecifics for resources depresses the realized fecundity (since 3b3 < 2b2).
Fig. 6b shows how the return map is gradually depressed and eventually falls below
the diagonal line xt+1 = xt . At this point, the population size decreases with every
iteration, eventually resulting in the extinction of the population.
3.3 Distribution of Individuals Among Sites Becomes More Uniform
Aswe have seen in the previous sections, evolution of site selection strategies generally
stabilizes population dynamics and, somewhat counterintuitively, occasionally results
in the extinction of the population through evolutionary suicide. Figure 7 shows that
the evolution of site-selection makes the observed distribution of individuals among
sites more uniform (underdispersed) compared with the strategy in which individuals
always settle in a site they encounter. If we change parameters in such a way that
the evolved strategy does not change, but the average number of individuals in a site
increases, we observe that the distribution becomes more and more underdispersed,
until all sites are occupied with the same amount of individuals, resulting in maximal
uniformity. If two different strategies result in the same average number of individ-
uals in a site, the strategy to settle only into empty sites results in the most uniform
(underdispersed) distribution. Such strategy is, for example, always reached through
evolution of site-selection under pure scramble competition. As the interaction func-
tion changes to allow for reproductive output also with two or more individuals at the
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Fig. 6 (Color figure online) Second route to evolutionary suicide: a a trait substitution sequence results in
the strategy s = (1, 1, s3, 0, . . .) becoming fixated in the population. b As a consequence, the return map
for the population dynamics changes and the stable equilibrium vanishes in a saddle-node bifurcation. This
results in the extinction of the population. c Phase diagram illustrating the resulting evolutionary outcomes
for different values of b2 and b3. The interaction function is given by Eq. 17
site, the distribution typically becomes less uniform but still more so than a completely
random site choice (the always settle strategy).
To substantiate the aforementioned conclusions, we assess the index of dispersion
of the resulting distributions of individuals per site by considering their variance-to-
mean ratio, roughly the spread in the number of individuals per site divided with the
average number of individuals per site. The always settle strategy, corresponding to
a Poisson distribution when K is large, has a variance-to-mean ratio of exactly one.
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Fig. 7 Evolution promotes even distribution of individuals: dependence of the mean and the variance-
mean ratio (the dispersion index) for the distribution of individuals among sites for four site-selection
strategies. The always settle strategy results in the Poisson distribution, for which the variance-mean ratio
is always one. The other illustrated strategies are of form given by (18), which is the form of evolutionary
stable site-selection strategies that the interaction functions we have considered have all given rise to.
These site-selection strategies always result in underdispersed (non-aggregated) distributions, for which the
variance-mean ratio is less than one
Distributions with lower variance-to-mean ratios are more uniform (underdispersed)
and those with higher variance-to-mean ratios more aggregated (overdispersed). The
interaction functions we have considered have all given rise to evolutionary stable
site-selection strategies of the form,
(s0, s1, . . .) with sk =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1, k  z	 ,
z − z	 , z	 < k  
z ,
0, k > 
z .
(18)
An individual with this strategy will always settle if the site contains less than z
individuals and never settle if it contains more than z + 1 individuals. For non-integer
values of z, there is an intermediate case in which the individual sometimes settles.
Our investigations indicate that the value of z depends on how fast the per-capita
reproduction rate declines with the number of individuals, with the lowest value z = 1
corresponding to pure scramble competition. The site-selection strategies of form (18)
give rise to a “truncated” Poisson distribution. Especially, for integer values of z, the
probability pk of having exactly k individuals in a site is given by
pk =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
λk
k! e
−λ, k  z,∑∞
j=z+1 λ
j
j ! e
−λ, k = z + 1,
0, k > z + 1.
(19)
Figure 7 shows how the variance-to-mean ratio depends on the average numbers of
individuals per site for the three distributions corresponding to z = 1, z = 2 and
z = 3. The strategy of always settling, corresponding to a Poisson distribution when
the number of sites is large, is also shown for comparison. All three distributions
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are more uniform than the Poisson distribution and the index of dispersion decreases
(uniformity increases) when the average number of individuals per site increases and
when the value of z decreases. Note that the mean of the distribution is not a parameter
that can be freely chosen, but instead emerges from the chosen interaction function
and the evolved strategy.
4 Discussion
Site-basedmodels have a long history in theoretical ecologywhere they have been used
to elucidate how the population dynamics are affected by competition for resources.
These studies have generally imposed assumptions on how individuals choose which
site to utilize. The most common assumption is that individuals choose sites entirely
at random, with uniform probability, although aggregated distributions (Brännström
and Sumpter 2005b) and distributions arising from spatial structure (Brännström and
Sumpter 2005a) have also been considered. Rather than assuming a distribution a pri-
ori, we have allowed site-selection strategies to evolve freely without any constraints
imposed. We found that, as a consequence, the population dynamics are typically sta-
bilized and the resulting distribution of individuals more uniform compared to Poisson
distribution resulting from the canonically assumed entirely random site choice (corre-
sponding to the always settle strategy). Interestingly, we also found that the evolution
of site-selection strategies occasionally results in evolutionary suicide.
Why do we not see individuals aggregating in sites? Our study can be compared with,
and was to a large extent motivated by, a recent publication by Nonaka et al. (2013)
which investigated whether the presence of an Allee effect can promote the evolution
of preferential attachment in a related site-based setting. That study concluded that
aggregation tendencies either did not evolve, or resulted in runaway evolution leading
to evolutionary suicide. The site-selection strategies in that study were restricted to a
single trait value representing the increased propensity of an individual to attach to
an already populated site. By contrast, we considered a vector-valued trait allowing
full freedom in the evolved site-selection strategies. An individual might, for example,
have the strategy of avoiding empty sites, preferring to settle in sites containing few
individuals, and entirely avoiding overcrowded sites. That we allow for any plausi-
ble site-selection strategy is most likely the reason why we do not find evolution of
preferential attachment. Instead, the evolutionarily stable site-selection strategies that
emerge are characterized by avoidance of overcrowded sites and thus result in more
uniform distributions of individuals among sites than a fully random site choice (corre-
sponding to the always settle strategy). The potential for evolutionary suicide remains,
though, and this scenario can unfold through either of two possible routes. There is
also a difference in the interaction functions considered. While we have systemati-
cally explored interaction functions for scramble competition under the assumption
that reproduction is never possible with four or more individuals at a site, Nonaka
et al. (2013) considered a version of Royama (1992)’s scramble interaction function
in which reproductive output declines geometrically with the number of individuals
at the site which had been extended to incorporate an Allee effect. We do not believe
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that this difference is fundamental, though further work is needed to investigate the
evolution of site-selection strategies for more general interaction functions.
Evolution and population-dynamical stabilityWhile our study is the first to investigate
unconstrained evolution of site-selection strategies in the site-based framework, other
authors have considered how evolution of salient individual traits affect the population
dynamics. The general conclusion emerging from these studies is that evolution often
but now always stabilizes population dynamics. This message is reinforced by theo-
retical studies which using stylized demographic models, consider evolution of traits
affecting population dynamics, such as traits related to carrying capacity, intrinsic
growth rate, maturation rate, and mortality rate (e.g., Gatto 1993; Doebeli and Koella
1995; Ebenman et al. 1996). Similar results have also been obtained at the commu-
nity level, with Zeineddine and Jansen (2005) considering two competing strains of
Drosphilia and Loeuille (2010) investigating a two-species Lotka–Volterra system
under different species interactions. The conclusions of the aforementioned studies
should be contrasted with Ferrière and Gatto (1993) who considered an age-structured
model with a trade-off between adult survival and recruitment rate, and Johst et al.
(1999) who found that in a spatially-structured model, evolution of dispersal rate and
a trait determining dynamical complexity can result in complex population dynamics.
Moreover, Mellard and Ballantyne (2014) found that the stability of an evolved com-
munity is generally less than the highest attainable; we do not find this very surprising
however and feel that the question should rather be whether the evolved community
is more stable than a randomly assembled extant community. The question whether
evolution stabilizes population dynamics has also been studied empirically. Mueller
et al. (2000) found that while important life-history characteristics of Drosphilia did
evolve, there were no noticeable effects on population-dynamical stability. A more
recent study by Prasad et al. (2003), also on Drosphilia, did, however, detect stabi-
lizing effects of evolution on the population dynamics. Although there is no obvious
reason to expect that the selfish interests of individuals should include stabilization
of population and community dynamics, the latter is apparently often an outcome of
evolutionary processes.
Ovipositioning strategies of insects A recurrent theme in the literature over the last
decades has been the dilemma faced by ovipositioning insects, and in particular par-
asitic insects. In these studies, females are faced with the problem of distributing
several eggs over discrete patches (such as susceptible hosts) which are encountered
sequentially. Among salient examples, Mangel (1987) used a process-based model to
explain why the actual clutch size laid by a female parasite in an encounter is often
lower than the clutch size found to be optimal in experiments. Mangel (1989) applied
similar methods to understand an experiment by Collins and Dixon (1986) on the
parasitization of Sycamore aphids by M. pseudoplatani. Horng (1994) considered an
optimization problem for beanweevils who sequentially encounter beanswith variable
number of eggs each and have to decide whether to oviposit or forego the opportu-
nity in the hope of a better opportunity before the terminal time. Using a framework
somewhat similar to ours, Ives (1989) studied how the ESS clutch size of insects
depend on type of competition among larvae within discrete patches. One study on
host acceptance by parasitic wasps by Plantegenest et al. (2004) has also shown that
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stochastic (random) strategies can sometimes be optimal, analogous to the singular
probabilistic strategies that we found. Our study complements this body of work by
explicitly considering effects on and by inter-generational population dynamics.
Evolution of sociality Several authors have used an eco-evolutionary approach to
explore the evolution of sociality. Avilés (1999) considered how two opposing forces,
cooperative interactions and negative density-dependence, results in the dynamics of
social groups (effectively analyzing the Ricker model with an Allee effect and related
models). Aviles et al. (2002) extended this framework to include the evolution of
grouping tendencies, inwhich the probability to join a groupwas assumed proportional
to the product of (i) the individual’s grouping tendency, (ii) the average grouping
tendency of individuals in the group, and (iii) a linearly decreasing function of group
size which equaled zero when the per-capita number of offspring in the group was less
than one. More recent work on the evolution of sociality include Purcell et al. (2012),
Shen et al. (2014), and Van Veelen et al. (2010). Using the methods presented here to
advance understanding of the evolution of sociality would be an interesting extension,
but it is far from being the only promising one.
Promising extensions Several extensions can be conceived. First, we could consider
the option of depositing a selective number of eggs at a site while retaining the remain-
ing eggs for possible future encounters. Second, the decision of whether to deposit
eggs could depend on the number of eggs that the individual still retains and the time
in the season. This would likely make the individual more selective for the last few
remaining eggs and less selective as the time passes. Third, if we interpret site-selection
not as the oviposition of eggs but as the habitat choice of individuals, we can include
factors such as territorial defense and local war of attrition in which an individual
may choose to leave a patch on which it has already settled when conditions become
unfavorable. Fourth, in line with the literature on the evolution of sociality, it would be
possible to consider strategies where existing group members have a say in the matter,
for example by not allowingmore members to join a group. Fifth, in our study we have
systematically explored interaction functions corresponding to scramble competition
with and without Allee effects, in which the reproductive output is identically zero
whenever four or more individuals settle in a patch. It would be interesting to consider
a more general class of interaction functions including, in particular, contest competi-
tion. This would likely change the conclusions presented here, as there is always some
benefit of settling in contest competition even if the site is already fairly crowded.
Finally, after imposing individual variability in competitive ability or other factors, it
would be very interesting to study how the evolved strategies depend on these factors.
For example, we expect that strong competitors will adopt aggressive strategies of
settling fairly soon even in crowded sites while individuals with lesser competitive
ability might search longer for empty patches.
5 Conclusions
Population dynamics arise from the life-history, interactions, andmovement of individ-
uals. Here, we have contributed to a better understanding of individual movement by
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considering the evolution of site-selection strategies for species reproducing in discrete
resource sites. In addition to characterizing evolutionarily stable site-selection strate-
gies, our work reveals that evolution of site-selection stabilizes population dynamics,
promotes even distribution of individuals, and occasionally causes the extinction of the
entire population through evolutionary suicide. Continuing our work in the direction
of an integrative and synthetic framework for site-selection and group formation is an
exciting and important challenge for the future.
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